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Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth
Amendment Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the morning of April 1, 1975, Sampson and Jeanette
Armstrong approached the back door of Thomas Kersey's rural
Florida farmhouse, ostensibly seeking water for their overheated
car.1 As Mr. Kersey, aged 86, stepped outside the house, Sampson
Armstrong grabbed him and pointed a gun at him. Mrs. Kersey,
having heard her husband's cries for help, ran outside with a gun
and shot and wounded Jeanette Armstrong. In the ensuing gun
battle, Mr. Kersey was shot twice and his wife was shot six times;'
both died as a result. The Sampsons then dragged the bodies into
the house, took the Kerseys' money, and fled.8
Witnesses testified that they had seen a man sitting inside a
car near the Kersey farmhouse at the time of the shooting." Fur-
ther testimony indicated that it was the same car in which Earl
Enmund had been seen that morning, first as a passenger with Jea-
nette Armstrong's mother driving, and shortly after the incident as
the driver.5 The State of Florida indicted and tried Enmund and
Sampson Armstrong together for first-degree murder and robbery.'
Although the prosecutor argued that only Sampson Armstrong
shot the Kerseys,7 the trial court found that each defendant must
have shot each victim.8 The trial judge instructed the jury that
"[t]he killing of a human being while engaged in the perpetration
of or in the attempt to perpetrate the offense of robbery is murder
1. The facts are taken from Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783-85 (1982), and En-
mund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1363-65 (Fla. 1981).
2. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1364.
3. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 784.
4. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1370.
5. Id. at 1364-65. There was, however, no direct evidence presented at trial to prove
that Enmund was ever in the car, and the state did not offer any evidence to show that
Enmund was ever at the back door of the Kersey house. Id. at 1370.
6. Id. at 1363. The State of Florida tried Jeanette Armstrong separately; a jury found
her guilty of two counts of second-degree murder and one count of robbery, and sentenced
her to three consecutive life sentences. Id. at 1371.
7. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 784.
8. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1372. The court reasoned that since Mrs. Kersey's
shot had incapacitated Jeanette Armstrong, and since Mr. and Mrs. Kersey were each shot
with bullets from different guns, Sampson Armstrong and Enmund each had fired at the
victims. Id.
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in the first degree even though there is no premeditated design or
intent to kill."9 Additionally, the judge instructed the jury that
under Florida law they could convict Enmund of first-degree mur-
der if the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he
was "actually present and was actively aiding and abetting" the
attempted robbery, and (2) that the "killing occurred in the perpe-
tration of or in the attempted perpetration of" that robbery.10 The
jury found Enmund and Armstrong guilty of first-degree murder.11
At the conclusion of a separate sentencing hearing, the jury recom-
mended the death penalty for each defendant.12 The trial judge
found four aggravating circumstances" and no mitigating circum-
stances14 in Enmund's case and sentenced him to death. Following
the trial court's imposition of the death sentence, jurisdiction im-
mediately vested in the Supreme Court of Florida for review of the
conviction and sentence.1"
The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the trial court's
findings that Enmund actively participated in the robbery and
murders. It found that the only evidence of Enmund's participa-
tion was "the jury's likely inference that he was the person in the
car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes."1 Never-
9. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 784-85.
10. Id. at 785; see FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1983).
11. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 785. Both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were
found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder pursuant to section 782.04(1)(a) (1973)
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1983)), which crime was punishable as pro-
vided in section 775.082 (1973) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1983) and § 921.141
(1975)) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1983)).
12. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 785. Section 921.141 (1975) provided two sentencing
options upon a capital felony conviction. If the jury found that there were insufficient miti-
gating circumstances to outweigh any aggravating circumstances, then it could recommend
that the trial judge impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment. The trial judge
maintained discretion to impose either sentence. If the trial judge imposed the death pen-
alty, he had to state in writing his specific factual findings indicating that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances.
13. Id. The aggravating circumstances were that the capital felony was committed while
Enmund was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery, see
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1983); it was committed for pecuniary gain, id. § 921.141(5)(f); it
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, id. § 921.141(5)(h); and the defendant had a pre-
vious conviction for a felony involving the use of threat or violence, id. § 921.141(5)(b).
Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1371-73.
14. Enmund v. State, 399 So.' 2d at 1372; see FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (1983).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1983) (providing for automatic review by the Supreme
Court of Florida of any death sentence within sixty days after certification of the record by
the sentencing court).
16. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1370. These factual findings differed significantly
from those of the trial judge, who found that Enmund planned the robbery and also shot
the Kerseys. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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theless, the Florida Supreme Court held that this evidence alone
was sufficient to make Enmund a constructive aider and abettor
and, affirmed the verdict of murder in the first-degree on the basis
of the felony murder provision of section 782.04(1)(a) of the Flor-
ida Statutes.17 More significantly, the Supreme Court- of Florida
rejected Enmund's argument that "since the evidence does not es-
tablish that he intended to take life, the death penalty is imper-
missible under the eight amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment"'" and affirmed Enmund's death sentence. The United
States Supreme Court granted Enmund's petition for certiorari,
which presented the question "whether death is a valid penalty
under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments for one who neither
took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life."' 9 The
Supreme Court of the United States held, reversed and remanded:
Where a defendant aids and abets a felony in the course of which a
murder is committed by others, but who does not himself kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place, the death penalty
is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
The Court's struggle over the constitutionality of the death
penalty itself and the ways in which states may or may not impose
that penalty20 began with Furman v. Georgia." Prior to Furman,
17. 399 So. 2d at 1370 (citing Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 446, 94 So. 865, 871 (1922)).
Florida law provides that all persons participating in the crime are principles of the first or
second degree, or accessories before the fact, in distinguishing between first and second de-
gree felony murder. The actual perpetrator is a principal of the first degree; one who is
present (actually or constructively), aiding and abetting the commission of the felonious act,
is a principal of the second degree. In a felony murder, both are equally guilty of murder in
the first degree. One who is an accessory before the fact is guilty of second degree murder.
See FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1983).
18. 399 So. 2d at 1371. The Florida Supreme Court held that there were only two, not
four, aggravating circumstances, but nonetheless affirmed the conviction and the death sen-
tence. The Court ruled that the trial judge's findings that the capital felonies were commit-
ted in the course of robbery and for pecuniary gain constituted in reality only one aggravat-
ing circumstance. The court further held that the crimes were not especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 1373.
19. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 787.
20. Prior to 1962, the Court had decided only nine cases involving the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause. Legislatures in nine states had abolished the death penalty, and
California had judicially abolished it. See Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legis-
lative History, 22 HowARD L.J. 53, 63, 84 n.94 (1979).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19841
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the Court had given implicit constitutional approval to capital
punishment by holding that a particular method of execution did
not violate the eighth amendment.' 2 Although the Court had found
certain punishments to be cruel and unusual, it had not explicitly
ruled on the death penalty. Moreover, the United States Constitu-
tion neither prohibits nor authorizes capital punishment.24 Argua-
bly, the due process clause embodies the notion of permissible dep-
rivation of life.2'
In Furman and the two cases consolidated with it,26 each de-
fendant was sentenced to death. One defendant was convicted of
murder, and the other two were convicted of rape. The statutory
schemes of the two states involved allowed the jury total discretion
in determining whether or not to impose the death sentence.2 7 In a
per curiam opinion, the Court held that the imposition of the
death penalty was unconstitutional in all three cases.2 Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White stated that the imposition of the
death penalty is cruel and unusual under statutory schemes that
leave the sentencing authority with undirected discretion in its im-
22. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (execution of con-
victed murderer, after first attempt failed due to mechanical defect in electric chair, did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
23. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (revocation of citizenship after convic-
tion by court.martial of deserter held cruel and unusual); see also Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910) (15-year prison sentence for falsification of public document held cruel
and unusual).
24. See Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The Constitutionality of North
Carolina's Capital Punishment Statute, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 737, 740 & n.36. The
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "excessive bail shall not
be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." It
was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
25. The fifth amendment states that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law" (emphasis added).
26. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (consolidating Branch v. Texas and Jackson v.
Georgia, both cases involving death sentences for rape convictions).
27. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969) (punish-
ment for murder) (current provision at GA. R. CiuM. P. 17-10-31); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302
(Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969) (punishment for rape) (current provision at GA.
R. CRIM. P. 17-10-31); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1189 (Vernon 1961) (punishment for rape)
(current version at Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33 (Vernon 1974) and §§ 21.02, 21.03, 21.09
(Supp. 1982)). Under Georgia's statutory scheme, the jury in Furman could choose between
life imprisonment and the death penalty following a murder conviction. In Georgia, the jury
could choose among imprisonment and labor (for one to twenty years), life imprisonment,
and death following a rape conviction. The Texas statutes gave the jury the power to impose
imprisonment (for not less than 5 years), life imprisonment, or the death penalty following a
rape conviction.
28. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
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position, thereby allowing it to be imposed arbitrarily and capri-
ciously.2 Justices Brennan and Marshall argued in separate opin-
ions that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in all
cases s
o
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS AFTER Furman
The Court's post-Furman eighth amendment analysis yields
two fundamentally different inquiries and methodologies." Em-
ploying one mode of analysis, the Court addressed the issue
whether the procedure used to impose a punishment is cruel in the
constitutional sense.32 Employing the second mode of analysis, the
Court addressed the substantive issue of whether a particular
punishment is cruel.33
The Court's focus on procedural safeguards in Furman places
it within the first analysis enumerated above. The Furman deci-
sion indicated that total discretion vested in the sentencing au-
thority leads to arbitrariness, thereby violating one of the basic
principles of the judicial system-that like cases be treated alike.
29. Three Justices filed a separate opinion in support of his opinion that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied in these cases. See 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
31. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for the tests' criteria.
32. That is, whether the procedure used to impose the penalty violates the eighth
amendment. This analytical approach will be referred to throughout this comment as the
"procedural" mode of analysis. Although it is distinguished from a due process analysis
under either the fifth or fourteenth amendments, the distinction is not always clear. Com-
pare Furman with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (jury sentencing without
legal standards in capital cases is not a due process violation). As one commentator coyly
pointed out,
In 1971, Dennis McGautha argued to the Supreme Court that unfettered jury
discretion in imposing death for murder resulted in arbitrary or capricious sen-
tencing and, hence, violated the fourteenth amendment right to due process of
law. He lost.. . . In the following year, William Henry Furman argued that un-
fettered jury discretion in imposing death for murder resulted in arbitrary or
capricious sentencing and, hence, violated the eighth amendment right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. He won ...
Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1980) (footnotes omitted). But cf. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 79 n.17 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). While the analysis in each inquiry
may be different, an individual case may explicitly rule that the procedure used in imposing
the punishment is constitutionally acceptable, thereby implicitly ruling that the actual pun-
ishment is not cruel in the constitutional sense. Id. The converse proposition is not necessa-
rily true; declaring that a particular punishment is not cruel does not necessarily mean that
the procedure used to impose it is unconstitutionally acceptable. See infra note 52 and ac-
companying text.
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According to Furman, a process is unconstitutionally cruel in the
eighth amendment sense if it enables one individual to be sen-
tenced to die while allowing another individual of equal culpability
to live.
As a result of Furman, state legislatures and Congress recon-
vened in a sometimes futile effort to enact statutes that would sat-
isfy Furman's inexact criteria for the procedures under which the
death penalty could constitutionally be imposed.34 State legisla-
tures and Congress eliminated unbridled sentencing discretion
from their death penalty statutes either by providing some sen-
tencing guidelines, or by making the death penalty mandatory in
certain circumstances.
Gregg v. Georgia5 employed both the procedural and substan-
tive modes of analysis. In Gregg, the defendant was sentenced to
death for a murder he deliberately committed during an armed
robbery. The state statutory scheme provided that if a defendant
was found guilty of murder, a pre-sentence hearing would be held,
at which time either side could present any mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors it deemed relevant." At least one of ten aggravating
factors listed in the state statutory scheme had to be found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant could be sen-
tenced to death. The jury could still take into account any mitigat-
ing factors in imposing its sentence, but the judge was bound by
the determination of the jury. In the Court's procedural inquiry,
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens combined with Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist" to uphold
Georgia's statutory scheme as in compliance with Furman's guide-
line that "discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."38
34. The capital punishment laws of 39 states, the District of Columbia, and all federal
statutory provisions were invalidated. See Tenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1979-80, 69 GEo. L.J. 211, 528 n.2514
(1980) (quoting 408 U.S. at 411-13 (Blackmun, J. dissenting)); see also, Note, supra note 20.
35. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2503, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (1978).
37. Furman and Gregg supply preliminary indications of emerging judicial factions:
Justices Brennan and Marshall have consistently argued that the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional per se; Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens have frequently voted together when
the issue is procedural; and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, sometimes joined
by Justice Blackmun, maintain a position of judicial deference. See infra note 84 and ac-
companying text.
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. Thus, the Court addressed the procedural issue of whether
this statutory scheme meaningfully distinguished those cases in which the death penalty is
imposed from those cases in which it is not.
[Vol. 38:357
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The Gregg Court also directly addressed the substantive issue
whether the death penalty is unconstitutional per se, holding that
"the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be
imposed."39 The Court stated that a punishment would be "exces-
sive" and hence unconstitutional if (1) it involved the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain, or (2) it was grossly out of propor-
tion to the severity of the crime.40 A court, when confronted with
the possibility of imposing the death penalty, must look to history
and precedent as well as to legislative attitudes and the response of
juries. 41 In analyzing whether the punishment involves the unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain, a court should consider
whether the penalty contributes to the social purposes of retribu-
tion and deterrence.45 Using these factors as guidelines, the court's
decision would accord with the "dignity of man," reflecting the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society. '48 The majority in Gregg thus adopted the erroneous
proposition that the moral content of the eighth amendment ban
on cruelty varies over time.44
In the same term that the Court decided Gregg, the Court de-
cided four other cases in which the death penalty had been im-
posed.45 Examining each statutory scheme in light of Furman, the
Court upheld those providing for guided discretion by the sentenc-
ing authority in its imposition of the death penalty,46 and struck
down those providing for mandatory imposition.47 This line of
cases, employing the procedural mode of analysis, indicates that
the Court opposed two sentencing extremes: the extreme of total
discretion, with no guidelines for imposing the death penalty, and
the extreme of mandatory imposition, where the sentencing au-
thority has no discretion in the imposition of the penalty.48
39. Id. at 187.
40. Id. at 173.
41. Id. at 176-82.
42. Id. at 183.
43. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 101 (1958)).
44. For the philosophical implications of this position, see infra notes 95-103 and ac-
companying text.
45. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
46. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
47. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976).
48. The 1976 cases also reflect the Court's struggle to identify criteria whereby legisla-
tures could draft statutes falling between those extremes. See generally Radin, supra note
32, at 1148-55.
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Coker v. Georgia49 marked a significant point in eighth
amendment history. There the Court struck down the imposition
of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, where the
victim's life had not been taken. Addressing this substantive issue
directly, the Court employed the two-part substantive test applied
in Gregg, using the attitudes of legislatures and sentencing juries
as objective indicators of the "public judgment as to the accepta-
bility of capital punishment."50 Justice White wrote the plurality
opinion,51 which held that even though imposition of the death
penalty in rape cases might serve a legitimate end of punishment,
such as deterrence or retribution, it was nevertheless a dispropor-
tionate, and therefore unconstitutional, penalty.5" By invalidating
imposition of the death penalty in circumstances where the rape
victim did not die, the Court subsumed within its constitutional
jurisprudence the moral caveat that the society and its judicial
constructs shall not take the life of an individual who does not
himself take life.58 This morality reappeared in the cases of Lock-
ett v. Ohio4 and Enmund v. Florida."
In Lockett, the defendant was sentenced to death for his par-
ticipation in a robbery that resulted in a murder, notwithstanding
that he did not actually kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the
victim.'6 The Court's plurality opinion reversed the death sen-
tence, holding that, because Ohio's statutory scheme restricted the
sentencing authority to consideration of only those mitigating fac-
tors identified in the statute, the sentencing authority was uncon-
stitutionally precluded from "considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death."' 7 The plurality holding in Lockett em-
ployed the procedural mode of analysis; it invalidated the death
49. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
50. See id. at 592-94; supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. Justice White also wrote the majority opinion in Enmund.
52. 433 U.S. at 592 & n.4. Thus, Coker emphasized that the two prongs of the substan-
tive test established in Gregg are disjunctive: it is possible, as in Coker, for the punishment
to be held unconstitutional on the basis of only one prong of the test. See supra text accom-
panying note 40.
53. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 125 (1977).
54. 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
55. 458 U.S. 782 (1982); see infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
56. Under Ohio's statutory scheme, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page 1975), the
jury was permitted to infer the intent to kill on the part of the accomplice. Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 593. Thus, the facts in Lockett are closely related to those in Enmund.
57. 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
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penalty on the basis of the manner in which it was imposed, rather
than addressing the substantive issue whether death is a cruel and
unusual punishment where the defendant has not killed, at-
tempted to kill, or intended to kill. In a concurring opinion, Justice
White forcefully argued that the Court (1) should have based its
holding on the substantive, rather than procedural, analysis; and
(2) should have concluded that, absent evidence proving the intent
to kill, the death penalty was grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime and therefore unconstitutional. 8 Lockett is of par-
ticular importance, because it foreshadowed Justice White's analy-
sis and substantive holding in Enmund while implicitly affirming
the moral proposition subsumed within Coker-that society shall
not take the life of one who did not himself take life."
The Supreme Court's analysis of the eighth amendment there-
fore entails the proposition that a decisionmaking procedure, as
well as a specific punishment, can violate the eighth amendment.6 0
Furman demanded that legislatures be more specific in enumerat-
ing the criteria to be used by sentencing authorities to distinguish
rationally between individuals sentenced to death and those of-
fenders of equal culpability sentenced only to life imprisonment."
The procedural test therefore provides that the death sentence
shall not be imposed under procedures creating a substantial risk
that the sentencing authority will impose the death penalty arbi-
trarily and capriciously." The sentencing authority must not be
precluded from considering any "aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-
58. Id. at 623-26 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
59. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text; infra notes 67-77 and accompanying
text. In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), the defendant, Beck, participated in a rob-
bery. According to Beck, his accomplice unexpectedly killed the robbery victim. The Ala-
bama statute required the jury either to sentence Beck to death or set him free. ALA. CODE §
13-11-2(a) (1975). The jury could not convict Beck of a lesser offense. The Supreme Court
overturned Beck's death sentence, relying on a procedural, rather than substantive, analysis.
The statute forced the jury to make an emotional choice between freedom and death. Ar-
guably, the jury might choose to acquit the defendant, despite its belief that the defendant
was guilty and should be punished, because it also believed that death was too severe a
punishment. This element of unreliability and uncertainty in the decisionmaking process led
the Court to declare the punishment unconstitutional.
60. See generally Radin, supra note 32.
61. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Demanding more specific criteria for
imposing sentences reflects the philosophical position that justice entails treating like of-
fenders in like fashion. See generally Hart, Principles of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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fendant proffers" as potentially mitigating factors." Each statu-
tory scheme must be considered individually. The statutory
scheme must provide direction to the sentencing authority in con-
sidering mitigating or aggravating factors, and consideration of the
individual's actions and culpability must not be precluded. 4
Under the substantive test derived primarily from Gregg and
Coker, a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel if it is (1) nothing
more than "the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering," or (2) grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime. 6 The court is to make its decision with reference to objec-
tive factors: (a) the history of the punishment, (b) legislative atti-
tudes, and (c) the sentencing decisions of juries.8 6 These objective
factors give content to the "evolving standards of decency." It is
against this backdrop that the Court decided Enmund v. Florida.
6 7
IV. ENMUND v. FLORIDA
Enmund's petition for certiorari presented the question
"whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to
take life, nor intended to take life."" The focus of the Court's in-
quiry was thus on the penalty imposed under these circumstances,
not on the procedures used to impose that penalty. Justice White,
writing the majority opinion, correctly cited Coker and Gregg as
supplying the appropriate test, because these opinions contain ex-
plicit substantive analyses and holdings on substantive issues. 9
In examining the objective factors enumerated in the substan-
tive test, Justice White noted that only eight states allowed a de-
fendant to be sentenced to death solely because he participated in
a robbery in the course of which a murder occurred.7 0 Additionally,
63. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. The potentially mitigating factors thus do not necessarily
have to be those specified in the statute.
64. Id, at 604, 606. Some Justices feared a return to the pre-Furman era of total discre-
tion in the sentencer. See id. at 628-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 623 (White, J.,
concurring). These fears have been partially quelled by subsequent cases. See, e.g., Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (reversing death sentence where statutory language too
broad and vague).
65. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. To avoid the first charge the punishment must contrib-
ute to one or both of two social purposes, retribution or deterrence. See, Gregg, 428 U.S. at
183.
66. Id. at 592-97.
67. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
68. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787.
69. See supra notes 37-44, 49-53 and accompanying text.
70. 458 U.S. at 792.
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Justice White asserted that there were only three prisoners in the
entire country who had received the death sentence for homicide
absent a finding that they hired, solicited, or participated in the
victim's murder.7 1 Finally, Justice White stated that not a single
person "convicted of felony murder over the past quarter century
who did not kill or attempt to kill, and did not intend the death of
the victim, . . . has been executed."7 This statistical analysis sup-
ported a conclusion under the second prong of the Gregg-Coker
test that the legislatures and jurors of this country considered
death a disproportionate penalty for those offenders falling within
the category exemplified by Enmund.75
Justice White next considered, whether, under the first prong
of the substantive test, the death penalty would have either a de-
terrent or a retributive effect on an offender like Enmund. He ar-
gued that, because the data supported the proposition that the
probability of death during a robbery is extremely low, and be-
cause the accomplice has no intent to cause death, the prospect of
a death penalty does not enter into his decision to rob; therefore,
the death penalty has no deterrent effect on such a person.7 4 Jus-
tice White also suggested that society has no right to demand retri-
bution through criminal penalties absent intentional wrongdoing;7 5
because Enmund did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, put-
ting him to death "does not measurably contribute to the retribu-
tive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts." '
Therefore, according to Justice White, the imposition of the death
penalty in Enmund was unconstitutional under either prong of the
substantive test distilled from Gregg and Coker: it is dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime, and it has neither a retributive
nor a deterrent effect.
Justice White also maintained that, as a constitutional re-
quirement, a court must consider the individual's conduct and cul-
pability;77 then, the Court must subjectively approve the punish-
71. Id. at 795.
72. Id. at 796.
73. Recall that the first and second prongs of the substantive test are phrased disjunc-
tively. Therefore, failure under either prong invalidates the punishment imposed. See supra
text accompanying note 40.
74. 458 U.S. at 799 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186). Justice White also cited the Amer-
ican Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment at 38 & n.96 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1981). 458 U.S. at 799.
75. 458 U.S. 801. The argument is that the punishment must suit the crime.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 800.
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ment.7 8 He cited Lockett v. Ohio 9 and Woodson v. North
Carolina"0 in support of this addition to the Gregg-Coker substan-
tive test.81 Reliance on Lockett and Woodson as authority for this
new requirement was misplaced, however, for neither of those
cases employed the substantive mode of analysis.8 2 The plurality in
Lockett did not adopt Justice White's substantive position that,
absent proof of an intent to kill, death is an unconstitutional pun-
ishment. 8 The plurality did adopt the position that the process by
which death is imposed must focus on the uniqueness of the indi-
vidual, but this was a criterion employed in a procedural analysis."
Hence, Justice White confused the two tests and their respective
criteria.
It is equally unclear whether failure under this new require-
ment of the substantive test, is sufficient to result in a judicial nul-
lification of a death sentence. Given the manner in which the sub-
stantive test now appears to be formulated, it is logically possible
for a punishment to be unconstitutional under both original prongs
of the Gregg-Coker test, yet be constitutionally approved by the
subjective judgment of the Court. The suggestion that the consti-
tutionality of a particular class of punishment could turn solely on
the subjective judgment of a majority of the Court is jurispruden-
tially unsound and contrary to Justice White's previous position. "
Thus, the functional importance of this new requirement to the
substantive test is ambiguous.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Enmund,8 stated that the ap-
propriate methodology for analyzing the issue before the Court is
to inquire
[1] whether the petitioner's sentence of death offends contempo-
rary standards as reflected in the responses of legislatures and
juries, [2] whether it is disproportionate to the harm that the
petitioner caused and to the petitioner's involvement in the
crime, and [3] whether the procedures under which the peti-
78. Id. at 797.
79. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
80. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
81. Id. at 798 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) and Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
82. See supra notes 45, 57-58 and accompanying text.
83. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 623-26 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment); supra text accompanying note 58.
84. See id. at 604; supra text accompanying note 57.
85. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (1977).
86. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the dissent. 458
U.S. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tioner was sentenced satisfied the constitutional requirement of
individualized consideration set forth in Lockett. 7
Justice O'Connor thus commingled criteria from both the substan-
tive and procedural tests, as did Justice White.8 8 Apparently, she
either confused the issue by unknowingly combining the two
modes of analysis or she knowingly proposed a new substantive
test and analysis. Textual passages suggest confusion: one passage
stated that the issue was not "whether a particular species of
death penalty statute is unconstitutional," but whether a particu-
lar statutory scheme is unconstitutional."9 Elsewhere, she stated
that the issue was "to determine whether the penalty imposed on
Earl Enmund is unconstitutionally disproportionate to his
crimes."'0
After her own examination, Justice O'Connor concluded that
"the available data do not show that society has rejected conclu-
sively the death penalty for felony murderers."' 91 Justice White
correctly pointed out that this conclusion regarding the available
data resulted from an inaccurate and broad reading of the issue.2
Justice O'Connor also argued that, because the defendant was at
least partly responsible for the murders, due to his involvement in
the robbery, and because the Court had previously approved the
death penalty for murder, the penalty in Enmund was not dispro-
portionate even if the defendant did not intent to kill or actually
kill the victim." Despite her position on the substantive issue, Jus-
87. Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor mistakenly
characterized the prongs of the texts as being conjunctive rather than disjunctive.
88. This analytical mistake in enumerating the criteria for the substantive test would
impel the dissent to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing, because of the trial
judge's alleged procedural mistake in not considering the "circumstances of the particular
offense" in imposing sentence. See id. at 827 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson,
428 U.S. at 304).
89. See id. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This suggests that the
issue is not the constitutionality of the punishment itself, but rather the constitutionality of
the "statutory scheme," or procedures, by which Enmund was punished. This is simply not
the issue raised by Enmund's petition for certiorari. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
90. Id. at 812 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This passage correctly suggests that the issue
is the constitutionality of the imposition of the death penalty itself under these factual
circumstances.
91. Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 793 n.15. The substantive inquiry is addressed to the situation in which
the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill; it is not addressed to unquali-
fied felony murders.
93. See id. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor incorporated into the
premise of her argument the notion that Enmund was "at least partially responsible" for the
deaths; this placed her conclusion inside one of her premises, thereby begging the question.
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tice O'Connor recommended vacating and remanding for a new
sentence hearing due to violations of the procedural rules set forth
in Lockett and Woodson.
94
V. INFIRMITIES OF THE DECISION
This comment argues that Enmund falls into the same class of
eighth amendment cases as Gregg and Coker; that is, the issue is
whether the particular punishment imposed for Enmund's crime is
unconstitutional. While the Court remained unwilling to hold the
death penalty unconstitutional per se, it was nevertheless willing
to invalidate its imposition for certain offenses. At the same time,
the Court continued to embrace the ethical proposition that it is
immoral to take the life of an individual who did not himself take
a life. Interestingly, Justice Marshall joined the majority opinion
without writing separately that capital punishment is unconstitu-
tional per se. Given the fact that the decision achieved a five to
four majority, Justice Marshall's vote may indicate the Court's
willingness to adopt a per se rule where the defendant has neither
taken a life nor intended that it be taken.
Despite these reaffirmations of the Court's previous positions,
Enmund promotes confusion in several areas. As the arguments in
this comment suggest, the Court did not delineate between the
substantive and procedural classes of eighth amendment cases and
their respective tests. Consequently, lower courts and legislatures
are left with scant guidance regarding the appropriate test of con-
stitutionality to be applied to cases and statutes. The holding of
Enmund is narrow and limited to cases where the defendant did
not intend to kill, attempt to kill, or actually kill the victim.
It is unclear whether the death penalty could constitutionally
be applied to an accomplice who did not participate in the actual
killing of the victim but who intended that the victim be killed. It
is possible that an accomplice could unwillingly participate in the
killing of the victim. Enmund does not indicate whether death
would be a constitutional punishment for that accomplice. Given
these uncertainties, Justice O'Connor may be correct in her dis-
senting view that the majority's decision effectively interferes with
the states' right to define legal guilt for certain offenses. 9" Argua-
bly, however, the decision does not interfere with the states' right
to define legal guilt, but it merely restricts the degree of punish-
94. Id. at 830-31, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 824-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ment that may be imposed for that guilt.
A more disturbing aspect of the decision is the Court's contin-
ued reliance on "evolving standards of decency" 9 as the barometer
for eighth amendment decisions.9 7 When the Constitution plays a
vital role in the decision to take someone's life, it functions as a
document of ultimate moral, as well as legal, principles. By posit-
ing that society's standards of decency "evolve," the Court com-
mitted itself to the view that the moral content of the Constitution
and, more specifically, the eighth amendment, changes with time."'
This commitment entails the proposition that the principles upon
which the court bases its decisions also change with time. The
Court's position is epistemologically unsound. Plato argued that
one can only know that which does not change, because it is impos-
sible to know something that is in a constant state of flux. If the
Court asserts that its moral decisions are based upon standards
that change over time, it is compelled to conclude that these stan-
dards are unknowable. If these standards are unknowable, the le-
gitimacy of the Court's moral decisions is greatly impaired. 100
The content of any moral concept cannot be supplied by a
posteriori factual judgments derived from public opinion or other
data. For example, if a representative crossection of citizens as-
serted the view that torture was an acceptable means of punishing
shoplifters, would the morality of torture change? It would not, be-
cause torture is a type of punishment that is always immoral. The
passage of time does not alter its inherent immorality. Assuming
arguendo that the most accurate representations of the moral posi-
tions of a country's citizenry are those legislative enactments
promulgated by its representatives, one would conclude that a
punishment is constitutional under the eighth amendment if it has
been promulgated by a legislature. 10 1 But such a proposition aban-
96. See id. at 789-97.
97. A complete philosophical analysis of the implications of the Court's position is be-
yond the scope of this comment. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); Ellis, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A Critique of the Philosophical Ba-
ses Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for Its Justification, 34 OKLA. L.
REV. 567 (1981); Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1978).
98. See Radin, supra note 97, at 1033.
99. See generally J.E. RAVEN, PLATO'S THOUGHT IN THE MAKING: A STUDY OF THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF HIS METAPHYSICS (1965); G.M.A. GRUBE, PLATO'S THOUGHT (1935).
100. But cf. Radin, supra note 32 at 1157-58. (implying that pre-Coker rapists were
unjustly executed because the "evolving standards of decency" did not evolve quickly
enough).
101. These arguments are posed in J.G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY,
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dons any means of "checking majoritarian excesses" and makes the
Bill of Rights a meaningless document.0 2
Even assuming that the moral content of the eighth amend-
ment is to be determined, not by majority preference, but by soci-
ety's "truly informed, educated, and morally sensitive"'103 mem-
bers, absurdity results. Such an argument would necessarily be
circular, because one would determine which individuals were
"truly informed, educated, and morally sensitive" by examining
whether they held the moral views one wanted them to hold. If
everyone finally agreed on who the "truly enlightened" people
were, the "enlightened" ones could only find a punishment objec-
tionable if it possessed some objectionable property; in such a case,
the punishment is condemned not because of the consensus among
the truly enlightened but because the punishment possesses the
objectionable property.104 Thus, the appeal to a consensus of truly
enlightened individuals becomes pointless, and the propriety of the
Court's reliance on the notion of moral standards that evolve over
time is seriously undermined. In its analysis of cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court must strive to develop an ethical theory
that avoids the logical pitfalls of majority preference and total
subjectivity.
There remains, after Enmund, a disturbing lack of unanimity
among the Justices on the metaethical justifications for its deci-
sions regarding the circumstances under which a state may consti-
tutionally impose the death penalty.
JOHN C. SHAWDE
223-26 (1979); see also Radin, supra note 32, at 1147 n.11.
102. J.G. MURPHY, supra note 99, at 225.
103. Id. at 226.
104. Id.
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